A coworker just dropped by the inform me that Florida’s anti-sodomy law was just struck-down. He prefaced it with, “Jordan, guess what? Good news.” I think he was kidding, but he’s a difficult guy to read sometimes. I’ll just go on thinking he was kidding.
This issue is an interesting one, with headlines on google news ranging from Right to privacy goes too far, to Gay rights affirmed in historic ruling (yeah that paper is in SF). The most interesting aspect of it, to me, is the way the two sides are presenting themselves. The gay-rights movement does a much, much better job of PR than their opponents. In fact, Scalia’s minority report in the supreme court decision was one of the first relatively well-spoken responses I’ve read. Calling the movement an agenda shows he is much more savy than the typical pastor or bigot who is quoted in opposition. Of course, being who he is, I would hope he would be.
The point he makes is one that is often overlooked on this issue. Society has a responsibility to dictate what behavior is acceptible and what is not. Where society draws the line may change, but there is indeed, a moral imperative that the line be drawn. Is homosexuality morally acceptable? Fornication? Adultery? Bestiality? Incest? After all, each could be said (except for possibly bestiality) to be a private affair of consenting adults effecting no one else, and therefore protected by this recent supreme court decision.
It’s interesting to note that so many Biblical prohibitions (like those above) were discovered later to be just plain common sense. For me and my faith, it is fairly clear where society should draw the line. We can argue where the line goes, but I think is important to realize that the disagreement is not about rights and wrongs, but morals, and the state’s enforcement of them, an issue not so cut and dry.
I don’t like gays. Never have. Personally, it disgusts me and would rather live in a world where I didn’t have to think about that stuff.
Left by Aristotle on June 27th, 2003
The issue has nothing to do with morals whatsoever. Nothing. It is a 14th Amendment question, pure and simple.
From Section 1: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; *nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.*” (emphasis added)
Had the Texas law in question banned sodomy altogether it would have certainly had a better chance of passing Supreme Court review, as the Georgia law contested in _Bowers v. Hardwick_ did. But it allowed sodomy between consenting heterosexuals, making only the homosexual act illegal. It is a pretty clear violation of the 14th Amendment, which the law in _Bowers vs. Hardwick_ wasn’t.
If you want to legislate morality (which, IMHO, is an impossible and misguided task in all but the most basic — incest, rape, etc. — instances, but that’s another issue altogether), you’ve got to do so equally or you will be, rightly, in violation of the 14th Amendment and now _Lawrence v. Texas_.
Left by John on June 27th, 2003
It is really, really sad that so many people are blinded from the far-reaching implications of the ruling because of religion and the focus on homosexuality. Just because you aren’t in the marginalized group now, if you ever find yourself on the unjust side of a law you’ll probably feel a whole lot different about the ruling.
Left by John on June 27th, 2003
If homosexual sex is immoral, and society has a responsibility to draw a distinction between acceptable and not, then it ~is~ a moral issue. Let me draw a comparison between incest and homosexual sex. Those who argue that homosexual sex is immoral, would compare it so. If you disagree with that, fine, you disagree with the _morals_, but not interpretation of the law.
Sx between close relations ~is~ considered a moral issue. Why don’t a consensual daughter and father receive *equal protection of the laws*? Because it’s a moral issue.
Left by Jordan on June 27th, 2003
Quoting an interview on FOXNews.com:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,90594,00.html
bq. LAZARUS: Well, let’s just go back to Justice O’Connor and what she is saying there, in this regard she agrees with the majority, is that it’s not a legitimate state interest to make the moral judgment that homosexuality is wrong.
Sure does sound like at least one of the justices thought of it as a moral issue…
Left by Jordan on June 27th, 2003
John, I think that this case hinged on “nor shall any state deprive any person on life, liberty, or poperty, without due process of law.” The court held that this was not a case of fundamental liberty, as acts of sodomy - including homosexual acts - have been since the origin of the nation considered illegal. It is additionally not denying anyone life nor property.
I disagree with the ruling because I do not feel that the court should be able to essentially repeal a law because of a political climate stating that the law is discriminatory and not protective. There are many laws which discriminate against a particular group of individuals for the protection of others. I do believe that this law was originally designated to be protective in nature - I believe that all laws should be protective in order to justify their restrictiveness. The majority - the people, legislators - had not repealed the law, and it still serves a protective purpose. There is still a large body of people who see homosexuality as not only immoral but criminal. While this group is diminishing in size, the law is still a statement of the majority until it is repealed by the majority. I see no basis for the court to rule that the majority do not believe that the law is protective until the majority have voted that way.
The other thing about this ruling that concerns me is that while at one time the idea of being able to discriminate against things that are not good was considered a good thing, the trend seems to be taking our nation to the point where any discrimination - even that which is protective - is considered illegal. I believe that the courts statement yesterday was another step to erode the discriminatory rights that the majority hold. The courts ruling sets a precedent that allows them to rule, although not solely on, but based on political climate and percieved discrimination. The political climate has no doubt changed over the last decade regarding gay rights, but the court still held that it had not changed enough to regard homosexuality as a liberty. Without that, I feel that the court is ruling based on their opinion not the majority, and that is setting a very unsettling precedent.
That being said, I do think that the law should be repealed, but the outlet for this repeal should not have been through the supreme court, but rather through the legislature.
Left by Jaime on June 27th, 2003
Regarding #4 and the incest example, think about it Jordan, they *do* receive equal protection under the law. It is _universally_ illegal. No permutation of children and parents engaging in sexual relations is legal. It is not that everyone should be allowed to do everything, it is that everyone should be able (or not able) to do the same things.
If, in some sort of crazy world, it were legal for daughters to have sex with their fathers but sons could not have sex with their mothers, then it would not be equal protection. See how that works? If laws make arbitrary divisions within the population, then it is un-Constitutional.
Left by John on June 27th, 2003
They’re not receiving equal protection; related people are specifically singled out and not allowed to have sexual relations, just because they are related. This is _exactly_ the same as the sodomy law for homosexuals.
The immorality (which is something we are assuming for the sake of argument) lies not just in the act, but in the act _and_ who is doing it. Which is why incest is illegal. It’s not just sex, it’s sex with very specific set of defined players. Just so with sodomy laws regarding members of the same sex.
I agree that if the immoral aspect was the anal sex part, and it was being arbitrarily applied to those of the same sex, it would be an equal protection issue. My claim, however, is that the moralty is not defined just by the act, but by those engaging in it. As I pointed out with incest above, I think it’s valid to take that into consideration.
Left by Jordan on June 27th, 2003
Jordan:
Justice O’Connor was saying that the state _shouldn’t_ predicate legal decisions about sexuality on moral judgments, unless really compelling circumstances dictate otherwise. In her mind, Texas got it wrong when it treated the question solely as a moral issue.
I don’t know whether that changes your opinion about the broader issue, but I hope that makes it clear that O’Connor was trying to strike a balance of interests here — she didn’t view it as an exclusively moral question. [And really, it bears noting that Justice Kennedy faulted the _Bowers_ court for treating _that_ case as though it turned entirely on a moral question.]
Left by Greg Greene on June 28th, 2003
Going out of town in a couple of minutes, but I wanted to weigh in:
You’re right, Jordan. The five justice majority relied primarily on the Due Process clause (not Equal Protection), extending the “right to privacy” developed through _Griswold_ and _Roe v Wade_ to include pretty much any consensual sexual activity between adults. The restrictions were a taking of “liberty” without Due Process.
O’Connor hinged her concurrence on the Equal Protection question, pretty much using John’s reasoning. A law differentiating between homosexuals and heterosexuals was unconstitutional in her view. (Though, John, doesn’t _every_ law make differentiations between one group and another: a law making nepotism in state hiring illegal differentiates between the rights of relatives of state employees and non-relatives.) She probably didn’t want to acknowledge as extensive a right as the majority and explicitly stated that moral disapproval wasn’t a legitimate state interest that would justify the Equal Protection violation, but preserving the traditional institution of marriage might be. Of course, the majority opinion’s substantive Due Process claim seems to pave the way for gay marriage.
Scalia’s dissent pointed out what I think is the biggest flaw in the majority’s opinion: the standard of review. Almost all laws are judged on a rationality standard: if the legislature was pursuing a legitimate governmental objective, the law should be upheld even if the justices don’t agree that law is wise. The only situations in which a heightened standard of review is granted are those where the law deals with a “suspect classification” (classifying on the basis of race, national origin or gender) and when laws infringe on a “fundamental right” (including Roe’s “right to choose”). The majority refused to overturn the central holding of _Bowers_ : that homosexual sodomy was not a fundamental right. The majority (and O’Connor) judged the claim on rationality and said that “morality” wasn’t legitimate.
But we legislate on morality all the time: adult incest, drug use in the home, prostitution, gambling, etc. Whether this is proper or not may be debatable, but that fact is that it has always been recognized as at least a _legitimate_ interest.
Personally, I agree with Thomas’s dissent. I think it’s a silly law and maybe the legislature should overturn it. It was hardly ever enforced and there are certainly more important functions of law enforcement. The legislatures of most states, in fact, have overturned their sodomy laws. By usurping the authority of the legislature on this matter, the majority has taken away the ability of a majority of citizens to decide through the legislative process how far they wish to go in recognizing “gay rights.”
In claiming that consent is the beginning and end of all questions on sexuality and that legislating on the basis of morality is not a legitimate interest of the government, the majority opened up a huge hole in the law through which certain individuals will be happy to ram their…agendas.
Left by Dan on June 28th, 2003
real quick on the ‘the law is still a statement of the majority until it is repealed by the majority’ point…i bet a majority of people in texas would vote for making Islam illegal, too, but we obviously can’t do that. legislation is a balance of both enforcing what the society thinks is morally decent and also paying attention to not trample minorities rights. there are few things that are so extraordinarly morally wrong that they’re banned ‘just because’, most laws have a degree of protection involved.
Left by Scott on June 28th, 2003
But as far as trampling rights, the supreme court didn’t find that this was a “fundamental right”. If it was a fundamental right then the law would have been unconstitutional no questions asked. I was not arguing that restricting freedom of religion, or discriminating based on race, gender, etc was acceptable. Only that as of right now, sexuality is not a fundamental right for anyone, homosexual or heterosexual. And Texas has every right to inact a law that governs sexual behavior if that is what the public wanted. I doubt that the majority of Texas would vote for the law today, but who knows.
Left by Jaime on June 28th, 2003
Jaime:
> Texas has every right to inact a law that governs sexual behavior
> if that is what the public wanted.
And a court has every right to overturn it.
The justices in _Lawrence_ were defending the right to privacy delineated in _Griswold v. Connecticut_ and _Roe v. Wade_, not the right to “sexuality.” Let’s leave that hot-button term out of this. Interpreting the law isn’t simply a matter of deciding whether a right is fundamental or not, and then drawing a conclusion based entirely on the outcome — the law has gray areas of rights and privileges that, though perhaps not sacrosanct, still need to be defended.
As I said before, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggested a balancing test. The right of legislators to draw a moral line, she reasoned, has to be balanced against our right as citizens to engage in consensual private acts. Sometimes the state has a compelling interest that overrides that right — say for instance the New York smoking ordinance, where the governmental interest in protecting public health outweighs our right to light up where we choose. At other times, though, the state has no compelling interest, aside from a majoritarian view of morality. In those cases, morality doesn’t always trump.
Left by Greg Greene on June 29th, 2003
Greg: Not necessarily. The court is strictly governed by what it can and cannot do, and if you read Dan’s comments above, I think he summarizes well the problems with the decision the court made. It’s not whether or not the law is appropriate, there must be more grounds for the court to overrule it.
For example, the court recently refused to strike down the CTEA (Copyright Term Extension act, aka Mickey Mouse Protection act) because it ruled that while it agreed the law was stupid and may have been very nearly unconstitutional, it was not the court’s place to strike it down. Ironically, I personally sided with the exact opposite of either of these decisions, however, the court itself seems to be playing two different sides. First it claims that it would love to do something, but can’t, and then when it seemingly should do the same thing on another case , it suddenly decides that it can go and dabble anyway when a more appropriate response was legislative, not judicial.
How would you suggest such laws against adult-incest reconcile with that reasoning? To me, that seems to be the state protecting the majority view of morality. Or take bigamy, for example. If those issues are justified in protecting the public health, isn’t it concievable that a state could decide that homosexual intercourse also presents a detriment to the public health? Again; my point is that this ~is~ a moral debate. If homosexual sex really presents a moral issue of a great enough magnitude (as those examples above), then it is reasonable that the state be allowed to legislate it.
The problem with the majority opinion is that it decimates any sort of reasonable basis with which the justice system can determine which of those laws are appropriate and which are not. O’Connor’s concurrence does little to ameliorate the situation, and is just as unable to make a distinction.
Left by Jordan on June 29th, 2003
Jordan:
Hmmmm … I think prohibiting bigamy has a little something to do with protection of the contractual obligations of a marriage. Just giving you my $.02.
As for the CTEA: I sided with Lessig as well, but _Eldred v. Ashcroft_ is distinguishable on the grounds that the Constitution delegates matters of copyright explicitly to Congress. The same can’t be said about sexuality — and if you take the Tenth Amendment seriously, as this court does (see the concurrence by Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, who wrote for the _Lawrence_ majority, in _United States v. Lopez_, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)), you can see why the justices in Lawrence might wonder where the legal foundation for the Texas sodomy law was.
(Yep, the Tenth Amendment _does_ address itself to the powers of Congress, that’s true enough. With the incorporation of the Bill of Rights _vis-à-vis_ the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, though, the Tenth is more properly read as reserving unenumerated rights to the people.)
You say that “[t]he court is strictly governed by what it can and cannot do,” but as Chief Justice Marshall wrote two hundred years ago, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” _Marbury v. Madison_, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). Judicial review can lead to the overturning of laws that many people want, but it occupies a central role in our constitutional system, and offers protection for rights and privileges that could otherwise go ignored. See, e.g., _Brown v. Board of Education_, or _Reynolds v. Sims_.
You raise the hypothetical issues of bigamy and incest, but I have to admit that I’m not much of a fan of parade-of-horribles arguments. For my take on how a court would handle cases about those subjects, go to this quote from Phillipe DeCroy, who blogs at the Volokh Conspiracy:
> I do not share Eugene’s sense (two posts below) that the Court’s
> opinion in Lawrence means that bigamous and incestuous sexual
> relationships between adults now are constitutionally protected.
> That may seem the natural implication of some of the language
> the Court used, but to take that language literally is, I think, to
> misread the way the Court operates and to exaggerate its commit-
> ment to consistency with the language of prior opinions.
What he said.
Left by Greg Greene on June 29th, 2003
Scott: The Constitution expressly protects the free exercise of religion from the whims of the majority, though I seriously doubt that the majority of Texans would favor making the practice of Islam illegal. The “right to privacy” was judge-made in the first place, and this is just a further judicial extension of a judge-made right.
Left by Dan on June 29th, 2003
It’s very hard to compare _Lawrence v. Texas_ and _Eldred v. Ashcroft_. Totally, totally different issues and sets of precedent. The court has the ability to decide to intercede in some cases and not others. Just because it does not intercede in one case and not another (especially given the huge differences between the two) does not automatically make their ruling null.
And while _stare decisis_ is an extremely important part of the court’s review process, this is certainly not the first time the court has reversed itself and acted outside of popular opinion. _Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas_ comes to mind, as it was an extremely unpopular ruling at the time, particularly in the South, and it went directly against the precedent set in _Plessy v. Ferguson_. But I don’t think any of us are going to argue against the ruling in _Brown_, are we?
I don’t think that this decision “decimates any sort of reasonable basis” to determine the Constitutionality of a law that rests of moral principles. It simply moves the bar, no longer allowing the “prevention” of homosexuality to be cited as a legitimate interest of the state.
(to take a break from legal arguments and discuss something that has been eating at me for a while concerning this) And seriously, what are we protecting, here? The institution of marriage? Do you really think that, thanks to _Lawrence_, thousands of men suddenly decided that sodomy is cool and start getting it on at the gym? Do you really think that it has made a single homosexual man think “you know, maybe I won’t get into a sham marriage and ruin my future wife’s life when I realize I can’t maintain it anymore and tell her I’m gay”? Of course not.
It wasn’t protecting _anything_. It was simply a tool to ostracize and publicly humiliate a group that represents a substantial percentage of the nation’s population. I honestly don’t know enough about Constitutional law to understand all the potential future ramifications of this decision (and neither do most, but obviously not all, of you), but it was a bad law that needed to be struck down. If the Texas legislature didn’t have the bravery to do it themselves, then I’m glad that the Supreme Court did.
Left by John on June 29th, 2003
Also, to further stab away at the differences between _Eldred_ and _Lawrence_, take the third paragraph of O’Conners’ concurring judgement:
bq. Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are scrutinized under rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster, since “the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” _Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center_, supra, at 440; see also _Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, ante_, p. ___; _Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc._, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Left by John on June 29th, 2003
Greg: If marriage is no more than a “contractual obligation”, there’s no reason to limit it to two people at the same time. I can imagine the lawyers at the marriage contract bargaining table: “My client will consent to a buy-out clause if your client will allow Cher to be made an additional party to the contract.” “Agreed, if my client can add Jean-Luc and can opt for free agency after two years.”
I think bigamy prohibitions are about a little more than that.
I agree that judicial review has its role in the checks and balances of our constitutional system, but:
“The Courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequences would be the substitution of their pleasure for that of the legislative body.”
-The Federalist #78
Also, I find it interesting that you cite _Lopez_, as one of the foundations of the majority’s holding there was that “the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” (See at 1631 n.3).
Left by Dan on June 29th, 2003
Dan:
> I find it interesting that you cite _Lopez_, as one of the foundations
> of the majority’s holding there was that “the states possess primary
> authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.”
So _Griswold_ was wrongly decided? _Loving v. Virginia_, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)? If not, why not?
How about _Pace v. Alabama_, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) — was that correctly decided? If not, why not?
If to define a law as a criminal law is to place it forevermore beyond inquiry, then you’re basically saying that our Constitution is whatever a large enough group of state legislators say it is. That surely can’t be your position.
Left by Greg Greene on June 29th, 2003
Oh — marriage encompasses loads more than a contractual obligation, no doubt. I said what I said to point out that there’s more to bigamy laws than a simple moral question.
Left by Greg Greene on June 29th, 2003
Greg: Of course that’s not my position. As for _Griswold_’s “penumbras”, at least Justice Douglas claimed some textual Constitutional guide, though I’m not entirely sure I agree with his reasoning. (A little of this, a little of that, *boom* right to privacy, expandable at will).
Personally, I think banning the use of contraceptives in married couples is on about the same level of “sillyness” as _Lawrence_’s sodomy law, though contraceptives in the 1960’s may have also implicated health/safety/welfare concerns. However, just because I or the Court view a law as unwise doesn’t mean that it should be struck down. (And as for your aforementioned distaste for slippery slope arguments, what would a contemporary observer have thought of _Griswold_’s evolution to _Lawrence_? A law allowing married couples to use birth control providing support for a ruling overturning sodomy laws?)
As for _Loving_, I think the Equal Protection argument was sound and the ruling striking down the ban on interracial marriages was absolutely justified. If only the Court had been as clear in the _Michigan_ cases (but that’s for another time).
My real problem with _Lawrence_ is the standard of review under which the court overturned the sodomy law - rationality. In both _Griswold_ (fundamental right) and _Loving_ (suspect class) the Court used strict scrutiny and struck down laws as not serving ‘compelling’ government interests in ‘narrowly tailored’ ways. If the majority had actually declared ‘consensual intercourse with any adult of one’s choosing’ a fundamental right I could understand the result. Of course, Scalia points out pretty clearly why they didn’t (and couldn’t) do that. Striking down the sodomy law as not furthering _any_ ‘legitimate’ governmental interest is what I see as the weakest part of the opinion. For the reasons I expressed earlier, I think that legislation based on morality has been and continues to be a legitimate function of government. Absent the violation of a ‘fundamental’ right, such legislation should not be struck down by the judiciary.
Left by Dan on June 30th, 2003
Wait, did I miss something? Everyone is saying that all anti-sodomy laws are unconstitutional based on the right-to-privacy notion that I can’t find anywhere in the constitution. I kinda like the notion of a right to privacy, but I think that it shouldn’t be able to make something that was illegal legal. If this right to privacy thing gets strong enough it will protect more than just sexual ills, no? I mean, I should have a right to privately grow/manufacture my own drugs and use them privately in my own home based on this, right? I mean, the government is having a really hard time enforcing it, and I’ve grown sick of the descrimination I face in the workplace as a drug user.
I’ve read that Greg doesn’t like the parade-of-horribles (I like that word choice, btw) thought line, but ignoring a major point just because you don’t care for it isn’t acceptable. (It is constitutionally protected though… much like… nm)
I think that there are plenty of other ways that this right to privacy thing can get out of hand, but I don’t want to write about it anymore.
What interests me is that these judges have a much stronger right to privacy than ordinary citizens. Their numbers are unlisted. The public is not supposed to know where they live. Perhaps they keep expanding the privacy rights because it is one of the few issues that is actually a very personal issue for them on a daily basis.
Lastly, I am wondering if there is anyone else remembering the past year or so when the Catholic church had some trouble with these sorts of sexual problems but not right to privacy. Couldn’t people of that ilk now claim that their right to privacy has been trounced and counter sue after being exposed as pedofiles?
Left by David M on July 2nd, 2003
Btw… since we all (all?) have the right to sodomize whomever consents to it, I feel that this post would fit well in the “Your Rights” category. Of course, it also would work in the Politcs category. and the Potpourri or Sucks categories. Oh, and maybe Nostalgia?? Anyway, I look forward to seeing which one it gets.
Left by David M on July 2nd, 2003
David, the post is in Observations. That’s where Jordan put it, and that’s (presumably) where it is going to stay. Though I must say that I’ve never seen _anyone_ give a rat’s ass about our metadata.
As for the right to privacy, read the majority holding in _Griswold v. Connecticut_, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). You’re not going to find it anywhere in the Constitution because it’s not there (or, rather, it’s not there in plain English but rather, according to _Griswold_, it can be construed from a number of different points — as Dan said, “A little of this, a little of that, *boom* right to privacy, expandable at will”).
You seem to have a … misguided … view of what the term really means. All of the examples you list (with the exception of the “parade of horribles,” which were the focus of much the debate that raged in the comments before yours) are clearly and unquestionably *not* right to privacy issues. Particularly the Catholic issue, as it involved both unconsensual sex and sex with a minor.
Left by John on July 2nd, 2003
I couldn’t see myself ever having a gay friend. Just couldn’t.
_Ed. Note: Only the last sentence was anything but totally subjective, so I figure I’d leave that. The rest, Chris, does not sum up the arguments above at all. If you dig homophobia, then that’s your thing, but don’t put words in everyone else’s mouth. - John_
Left by Aristotle on July 3rd, 2003
^ Ok, my bad. I was a little out of it last night.
Left by Aristotle on July 3rd, 2003
Pet peeve: The term “homophobia” makes absolutely no sense etymologically. From its Greek roots, it would mean “fear of the same” or “fear of someone like you” - when most people labeled as “homophobes” actually have a problem with individuals that have sexual practices _unlike_ their own. I don’t think the “phobia” part is accurate either. Do “homophobes” _fear_ homosexuals or simply dislike the behavior? I’d say it’s more often a dislike or desire to avoid than “fear”.
Utterly irrelevant but, as I mentioned, a pet peeve.
Left by Dan on July 3rd, 2003
John, I most likely am “misguided” when I am using just about any legal term. I am posting to get more information by asking questions; I’m probably not really posing any worthy arguements. I don’t really know what is going on in the law (past or present) and I am reading what you guys write and asking questions to try to make sense out of things and maybe learn something from people who seem to know more than me.
I was thinking of right to privacy as something that might act as a protection that sort of trumps the wrongs that you have done. I was not saying that those issues were currently right to privacy issues, but that people may try to make them right to privacy issues to win their cases. For instance, is it possible that someone in the future might be able to argue that growing/synthesizing drugs in your own home for your own personal use is a private thing, and thus should be protected under the right to this privacy clause? I feel that it could be argued that way, but I don’t have the full story because I seem know only enough law to be annoying (to myself and probably others.) I haven’t used drugs, but I think that people who do/have probably would be a lot happier if they didn’t have to worry about drug tests and other ways that work places ‘discriminate’ against members of the drug culture. To me this is a loose argument and a bit of humor, but I am learning that things seem a lot more humorous to me when I don’t know much at all… or when I am missing a chunk of information.
Thanks for responding to me. I found the post in Observations now… I hadn’t seen it there before you told me it was there. I like the meta-data in this site.
Left by David M on July 6th, 2003